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Limitation of Liability
CRAIG H. ALLEN
I
INTRODUCTION
In 1851, Herman Melville published Moby Dick, Donald McKay sent the
record-setting clipper Flying Cloud on her maiden voyage, and Congress
passed the Act of March 3, 1851, providing shipowners a qualified right to
limit liability. ' While Moby Dick went on to become a classic, the Limitation
Act is now viewed by most as a relic of the clipper ship era in which it was
launched. There is little reason to believe there will be many celebrants at
next year's sesquicentennial banquet for the Act.
There are those who will argue that the Limitation Act now plays a
relatively insignificant role in private maritime law and is therefore less
deserving of judicial study than other, more critical, aspects of the law. Data
compiled by the Maritime Law Association (MLA) lend some support to
that position. According to the MLA study, between 1953 and 1996 only 166
limitations cases were pursued to judgment in the U.S.2 Limitation was
granted in 63 of those cases and denied in the other 103, a ratio that some
attribute to the courts' hostility to the Act. Yet neither desuetude nor judicial
animus is likely to lead to a repeal of the Act in the near future. No nation
wants to be the first to abandon shipowner limitation and expose its
shipowners to the competitive disadvantages of unlimited liability, or
become the court system of choice for sophisticated international forum
shoppers. Thus, the federal courts will likely continue to be called up to
adjudicate limitation actions, often in the complex litigation setting that
inevitably follows in the wake of a significant marine casualty.
Limited liability is hardly unique to admiralty. The Warsaw Convention
limits the liability of international air carriers 3 and the Price-Anderson Act
prescribes a limited liability regime for nuclear power plant operators in the
*Assistant Professor of Law and Director, Law & Marine Affairs Program, University of Washington
(Seattle). B.S., Portland State University; J.D., University of Washington.
19 Stat. 635 (1851), codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-189. The Act had no formal title.
2
The MLA Report, MLA Doc. No. 729 (May 2, 1997), at 10487, 10527-36.
3
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
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U.S. 4 Congress has also enacted loss-specific statutes applicable in maritime
cases, including the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 5 the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990,6 and the Comprehensive Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA). 7 Internationally, much of the world now
adheres to the 1976 International Convention on Limitation of Liability for
Maritime Claims (LLMC Convention). 8 The LLMC Convention prescribes
limits that are generally higher than those prescribed by the U.S. Limitation
Act, but are said to be unbreakable for all practical purposes. 9 The related
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC)' 0 limits a shipowner's liability for oil spill damages, while adopting
a "personal act or omission" standard for depriving the owner of limited
liability. The U.S. has declined to join either of the international liability
conventions.
From the list of "problems" with the Limitation Act in the U.S. that are
within the federal courts' power to resolve, I have elected to discuss three.
Necessarily, the coverage of each problem will be brief. After a short
summary of the Limitation Act's principal features, the essay examines the
recurring confusion over the relevance of unseaworthiness in limitation
actions. Second, it highlights the need to update the courts' choice of law
doctrine for limitation issues. Finally, it turns to an issue that is only
beginning to emerge, and one which the federal courts may yet save from
idiosyncratic precedents that further separate the U.S. from the rest of the
international community. By 2002, virtually all seagoing merchant vessels
will be required to comply with the International Safety Management Code
(ISM Code), a sweeping new mandate for vessel owners and mangers to
implement vessel safety management and environmental compliance systems. The effect of the ISM Code regime on shipowner limitation of liability
may be dramatic. Some believe that a shipowner's qualified right to limit
liability under U.S. law will effectively be eliminated by the new Code. They
might be right, at least if federal courts in the U.S. continue to expand the
concluded Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1934) (limiting air carrier's
liability for injury or death claims to $75,000/passenger).
442 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (generally limiting operator's public liability to $500 million or less).
546 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (limiting carrier liability to $500/package or customary freight unit).
633 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (limiting vessel liability to $1200/ton for tankers and $600/ton for other
vessels).
'42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (limiting vessel liability to $300/ton).
81ntemational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability
of Owners of Seagoing Ships, entered into force Dec. 1, 1986, reprinted in 6 Benedict on Admiralty Doe.
No. 5-4 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
9Boal, Efforts to Achieve International Uniformity of Laws Relating to the Limitation of
Shipowners' Liability, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 1277, 1296 (1979).
l°Entered into force June 19, 1975, 973 U.N.T.S. No. 3, reprinted in 6A Benedict on Admiralty Doc.
No. 6-3 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
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concept of shipowner "privity or knowledge" under the Limitation Act to
embrace objective knowledge. The result could be that within the U.S. only
recreational boat owners and others who fall outside the ISM Code regime
will have any chance of limiting liability under U.S. law, while shipowners
in nations that adhere to the 1976 Limitation Convention, which rejects the
vague privity or knowledge standard, will continue to limit their liability,
without compromising their compliance with the ISM Code.
II
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE U.S. LIMITATION ACT
A ship comes to grief, the Lutine Bell on the floor of Lloyd's is solemnly
struck, and cargo and injury claims in U.S. courts soon follow. The
shipowner reflexively turns to the Limitation Act. There the shipowner
learns that owners and demise charterers of U.S. and foreign vessels,
including U.S. pubic vessels, may under some circumstances limit their
liability to the value of their interest in the vessel and her pending freight at
the end of the voyage."I Additional limits ($420/ton) may apply to owners
of seagoing vessels in cases involving liability for loss of life. 12 Some claims
are not subject to limitation under the Act, including those for wreck
removal, oil spill removal costs and damages in the U.S., and seamen
maintenance and cure claims. Although a U.S. limitation action has no effect
on claimants who choose to pursue their claims outside the U.S., the action
may provide the benefits of a forum concursus within the U.S., enabling the
shipowner (and the judiciary) to consolidate liability and limitation litigation
in a single court.
A. The Burden of Proof

In evaluating a shipowner's right to limit liability, the courts have adopted
a two-step inquiry. 13 The first step, generally referred to as the "exoneration"
inquiry, determines whether the shipowner seeking exoneration or limitation, or those for whom the owner may be vicariously liable, committed
actionable fault that caused the injury or loss giving rise to the claims for
which limitation is sought. 14 The fault may consist of negligence or an

"'See

46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) and Rule F, Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims. Limitation for public vessels is provided by 46 U.S.C. app. § 789.
1246 U.S.C. app. § 183(b).
13See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida (The Summit Venture), 768 F.2d 1558,
1563-64 (1 th Cir. 1985); Farrell Lines Inc. v. Jones (The African Neptune), 530 F.2d 7, 10, 1976 AMC
1639 (5th Cir. 1976).
14A shipowner may also limit liability for some claims that sound in contract, but because such claims
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unseaworthy condition of the vessel. Only those faults that were a cause of
the claimants' loss are considered. Unless the shipowner has conceded fault,
the claimants bear the burden of proof in this first step in the inquiry. In the
absence of such proof, the owner is exonerated of liability and the court need
proceed no further.
Should one or more claimants prove causative fault, liability for those
claims is established. The court then advances to the second step in the
inquiry, to determine whether the owner is entitled to limit its liability for
those claims. The courts' "limitation" analysis turns on whether the
causative fault giving rise to the claims established occurred with the
owner's "privity or knowledge." The burden of proof is reversed in this
second step, requiring the owner seeking limitation to prove that the
causative fault occurred without the owner's privity or knowledge. The
distinction is apparent in the Fifth's Circuit succinct conclusion in Farrell
Lines, where the court stated that the "accident resulted from lack of care and
failure to exercise proper procedures by those on the bridge. For this Farrell
is liable, but it is also entitled to limit liability."' 5 Similarly, Judge Friendly,
writing for the Second Circuit in In re Kinsman Transit Co., evaluated the
effect of the knowledge of the owner's mooring master on the owner's right
to limit and held that his "knowledge is imputed to the corporation on the
issue of exoneration, but that is precisely what the statute forbids on the
issue of limitation."16
The reversing burden of proof is occasionally blurred, particularly in cases
involving allegations of unseaworthiness. A leading collision law text
suggests, for example, that the burden of proof requires an owner seeking to
limit liability in the U.S. to prove: (1) seaworthiness of the vessel's hull and
equipment; (2) competence of the crew, including proper licensing, training
and shipboard experience; (3) a cause of the loss not involving privity (e.g.,
negligent navigation by a qualified watch officer, or elimination of all
possible causes which would involve privity where the cause cannot be
shown precisely); and, (4) absence of actual control of the activity causing
the loss by corporate officers, directors, managing agents, or managerial
employees of the owner.' 7 More accurately, the burden of proof on the first
issue and probably the second, depending on the nature of the underlying
claim, is on the claimants in the exoneration phase.18 Only after the
are not generally relevant to the liability implications of the new ISM Code this brief essay will focus on
claims based on fault,
156Farrell, 530 F.2d at 13.
1 In re Kinsman Transit Co. (The MacGilvray Shiras), 338 F.2d 708, 715, 1964 AMC 2503 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965).
17N. Healy & J.Sweeney, The Law of Marine Collision 390-91 (1998) (citations omitted).
1SFarrell, 530 F.2d at 10 ("although the petitioner in limitation bears the burden of proving lack of
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claimants prove causative negligence or unseaworthiness does the burden
shift to the petitioning owner in the limitation phase on the latter two issues.
In their discussion of seaworthiness and limitation, the authors also make no
distinction between claims by those to whom a duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel is owed and those to whom no such duty exists, a point I will come
back to below.
B. Direct Shipowner Liability for Own Faults

Under familiar tort principles a shipowner is directly liable as an actor if the
owner breaches a legal duty thereby causing harm to another. Fault under
those circumstances is determined by traditional duty, breach, and causation
principles. The owner may also incur direct liability in its capacity as master
(in the agency sense) with respect to its servants employed in operating or
maintaining the vessel. The Restatement of Agency recognizes at least four
instances where a master may be directly liable for harm. They include
negligence or recklessness by the master in: (1)giving improper or
ambiguous orders or failing to establish proper regulations; (2) employing
improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to
others; (3) supervision of the activity; or, (4) permitting, or failing to
prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not his
servant, upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control.' 9
Admiralty courts addressing a shipowner's direct liability in its capacity
as master have imposed liability (and denied limitation) where the shipowner failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting or training the vessel
master or crew. 20 The courts have also concluded that providing instructions
to vessel masters and crews may not be sufficient to avoid direct liability. In
Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The Linseed King),21 for example,

the Supreme Court held that mere instructions to subordinate employees to
comply with the company's safety directives will not entitle the owner to
limitation of liability if the employees fail to follow those directives. The
owner must also implement measures to ensure compliance or follow up
those instructions with inquiries or inspections. In Coryell v. Phipps (The
Seminole), the Supreme Court acknowledged that an owner may delegate
some of its responsibilities as owner to an agent, so long as the agent is

privity or knowledge, the initial burden of proving negligence or unseaworthiness rests with the
libellants.") (citation omitted).
19 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958).
20
See, e.g., Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida (The Summit Venture), 768 F.2d 1558
(1 th Cir. 1985).
21285 U.S. 502, 1932 AMC 503 (1932).
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competent to perform the task. 22 Later decisions have further defined the
circumstances under which an owner may limit liability for negligence by its
23
agents and employees.
C. Shipowner Vicarious Liability for Faults of Agents and Employees

In addition to potential direct liability for the shipowner's own acts or
omissions, the owner may be vicariously liable for the torts of its servants.
In general, one is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. 24 The
owner (or charterer) may, however, be liable for negligence by contractor
who performs a non-delegable duty of the owner.25 The shipowner, as
master, may also be vicariously liable for torts by its servants committed
within the scope of the agent's employment. 26 It is well established that the
master and crew of a vessel under demise charter are servants of the
charterer and not the owner. Under such circumstances the owner is not
vicariously liable for torts committed by the crew. Similarly, neither an
owner nor a charterer is liable for the torts of a compulsory pilot. In both
cases, the master-servant relationship necessary for imposing vicarious
liability is lacking.
D. Privity or Knowledge of Faults of Agents or Employees

Even where the shipowner would otherwise be vicariously liable for the
torts of its agents, the Limitation Act may permit the owner to limit that
liability if the underlying fault occurred without the owner's "privity or
knowledge." 27 Unfortunately, Congress expended no effort in the legislation
in providing guidance on what it intended by those terms. It is common to
attribute the oversight to the novelty of the corporate form of enterprise
organization in 1851, but Congress was no more enlightening when it
incorporated those same terms into CERCLA over a century later.28 The
22317 U.S. 406, 1943 AMC 18 (1943) (holding that shipowner who selects competent persons to
inspect
a vessel and is not on notice as to existence of a defect cannot be denied limitation).
23
See In re Complaint of Sheen, 709 F. Supp. 1123, 1989 AMC 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding that
shipowner is entitled to limitation in cases where inspection and management is delegated to another only
if the owner (1)inspects or arranges for a reasonable inspection service; (2) chooses employees with
reasonable care; and, (3) gives suitable general instructions).
24
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965). The person engaging the contractor may, however, be
liable where the contractor or its employee has injured another if the person was, for example, negligent
in selecting the contractor. See id. § 411.
25
Restatement of Agency, supra note 19, § 214.
6
2 ld. §§ 219 & 243-249.
2746 U.S.C. app. § 183(a).
2

8See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2).
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cases examining privity or knowledge reveal two dimensions to the analysis.
First, the court must examine whose knowledge "counts," as it were;
particularly where the owner or charterer is a corporation which acts through
its agents and employees. Second, the court must determine the kind of
knowledge that counts, perhaps distinguishing between actual and constructive knowledge (or subjective and objective knowledge).
Early decisions seeking to define the bounds of privity or knowledge
concluded that:
[P]ersonal participation of the owner in some fault, or act of negligence,
causing or contributing to the loss, or some personal knowledge or means of
knowledge, of which he is bound to avail himself of a contemplated loss, or of
a condition of things likely to produce or contribute to the loss, without

adopting appropriate means to prevent

it.29

Thus, "privity" extends to those faults in which the owner actually
participated, while "knowledge" includes those faults of which the owner
had personal cognizance. In the ensuing years, the courts have added
considerably to this early attempt at definition. Whether the later verbal
formulations dispel the doctrinal brume is debatable.
1.Whose Privity or Knowledge Precludes Limitation?
The test for determining whether causative fault was committed with the
owner's privity or knowledge depends in part on the nature of the owner.
The test for individual owners presents few problems, except where the
individual owner delegates some or all of his or her duties as owner to
another. Under circumstances involving reasonably limited delegation, only
the owner's personal knowledge or participation is relevant to the limitation
inquiry. If, however, the scope of authority delegated by the individual
owner is overly broad, the delegee's privity or knowledge may be imputed
to the owner. 30 And, of course, the individual owner may be denied
limitation if he or she failed to select competent persons to inspect and
operate the vessel (a basis for direct liability) or if the owner was on notice
as to the existence of the fault giving rise to the claims. 31 It should also be
noted that in claims for personal injury or loss of life involving "seagoing
vessels," 32 whether against individual or corporate owners, the privity or
29

Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. Co., 15 F. Cas. 884, 887-88 (C.C.D. Cal. 1877), aff'd, 102

U.S.30 (12 Otto) 541 (1880).

1n re Guggenheim (The Trillora 11), 76 F. Supp. 50, 1948 AMC 132 (E.D.S.C. 1947).

31
32

See Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406, 412, 1943 AMC 18 (1943).
The statutory class of "seagoing vessels" excludes, inter alia, pleasure yachts, tugs, towing vessels,

and fishing vessels and their tenders. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(f).
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knowledge of the vessel's master or of the superintendent or managing agent
33
at or prior to the commencement of each voyage is imputed to the owner,
thus enlarging the test. Where the limitation action includes mixed claims,
some of which are for loss of life, the court may be called upon to conduct
separate privity or knowledge analyses for each, examining the owner's
privity or knowledge regarding the causative fault for property damage or
personal injury claims under the general test, then separately examining the
master's knowledge regarding the causative faults relevant to the death
34
claims.
The test for corporate owners turns on the facts of the particular case, but
emphasizes the "knowing" individuals' position and responsibilities. The
nature of the problem in evaluating corporate privity and knowledge was
described the Supreme Court in Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole).35 The
Court acknowledged that corporations necessarily act through human
beings. The privity of some of those persons must be imputed to the
corporation or the corporation could always limit liability. On the other
hand, if the privity or knowledge of everyone within the corporation were
imputed to it the corporation would never be permitted to limit liability. The
key, determined the Court, is to determine "where in the managerial
hierarchy the fault lay." 36 As some have put the issue, a corporation is
charged with the privity or knowledge of its employees when they are
"sufficiently high on the corporate ladder. '37
The Court in The Seminole included corporate executive officers, managers, or supervisors "whose scope of authority includes supervision over
the phase of the business out of which the loss or injury occurred" 38 within
the class of corporate actors whose privity or knowledge would presumably
be imputed to the corporate owner. Citing the Court's earlier decision in
Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The Linseed King),39 The Seminole
defines the circle of corporate attribution by position, but also ties the
definition to the person's actual responsibility. The question of keen interest
under the new ISM Code regime will be the extent to which the privity or
33

1d. § 183(e).

34

See Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Armco Steel Corp. (The Mormackite), 272 F.2d 873, 1960
AMC 185 (2d Cir. 1959) (denying limitation as to seamen death claims, for which master's knowledge
of unseaworthiness was imputed to owner, and granting it as to cargo claimants, for which master's
knowledge was not imputed), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960).
3'317 U.S. at 410-11 (dictum).
36
1d. at 411.

37

Cupit v. McClanahan Contractors, Inc., 1 F.3d 346, 348, 1994 AMC 784 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1113 (1994).
3'317 U.S. at 410 (citing The Linseed King, infra).

39285 U.S. 502, 1932 AMC 503 (1932) (concluding that "Stover's position as works manager... and
the scope of his authority render his privity or knowledge that of the company.").
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knowledge of the shipowner's "Designated Person Ashore" will be imputed
to the owner or demise charterer in U.S. limitation actions under the
position-plus-responsibility test.
2. What Kind of "Knowledge" Precludes Limitation?
To give effect to the Limitation Act the courts must determine what kind
of knowledge Congress intended would defeat a shipowner's qualified
limitation privilege. The trend in decisions in the 19th century reflects a
focus on the petitioning shipowner's subjective or actual knowledge of the
causative fault or, where relevant, unseaworthy condition. Early decisions
expressly rejected a constructive knowledge test. 40 Knowledge of an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, where there is a duty to protect another
from such harm, is the foundation for tort liability. One who has knowledge
of a dangerous condition and fails to take reasonable steps to remedy it or to
warn of the danger may be liable in negligence for harm proximately caused.
This principle is generally understood to mean, however, that a person will
not be liable unless the person had "knowledge" of the danger at a time when
it could be remedied. If the person is an employee who was acting within the
scope of his or her employment, the employer may be vicariously liable for
the harm. If the employer is a qualified shipowner, however, the owner will
be entitled to limit its liability unless the fault occurred with the owner's
privity or knowledge.
As evidenced in the Supreme Court's 1932 decision in The Linseed
King,4 1 the knowledge inquiry was later enlarged to include an objective
standard, in which the courts ask not only what the owner actually knew but
also what the shipowner should have known. 42 Implicit in the objective
standard is that privity and knowledge will depend on the owner's compliance with a duty to reasonably inspect and inquire. 43 Whether viewed as an
expansion of the owner's direct liability for negligence or a curtailment of
the owner's right to limitation under a theory of constructive knowledge the
4°The 84-H, 296 F. 427, 1924 AMC 774 (2d Cir. 1923) ("[t]he privity or knowledge must be actual

and not merely constructive."), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 596 (1924).
4'285 U.S. 502, 1932 AMC 503 (1932).
G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 10-24, at 886 (2d ed. 1975); see also Restatement

42

of Torts, supra note 24, § 12 ("should know" denotes the fact "that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the
performance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact
exists.").
43
See, e.g., Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A. v. United States, 730 F.2d 153, 155, 1984
AMC 1698 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the shipowner's knowledge need not be actual. "The shipowner
is chargeable with knowledge or acts or events or conditions of unseaworthiness that could have been
discovered through reasonable diligence.").

272

Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce

Vol. 31, No. 2

effect on limitation will be largely the same. It will be seen in Part V of this
essay that the ISM Code creates new affirmative duties to inspect and
inquire. When combined with the owner's other duties to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, and supervising its employees, the duty to
inspect and inquire may well complete a construct of liability that dramatically limits the possibility that the vessel's condition or the conduct by those
on board can occur without the owner's "privity or knowledge."

III
LIMITATION IN CASES ALLEGING UNSEAWORTHINESS
The analysis by some courts in limitation actions demonstrates a misunderstanding of the relevance of the unseaworthiness doctrine in exoneration
and limitation. The confusion may be attributable in part to what Professors
Gilmore and Black once argued was a "non-delegable" duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel in the "primitive sense,' 44 for which privity or knowledge
should be, in the authors' opinion, automatic. The concept found limited
acceptance in the courts, 45 and even the authors conceded in the second
edition of their treatise that their assertion that such a duty existed lacked
46
authority.
It will be recalled that only those claims that survive the exoneration step
in the analysis are considered in the second (limitation) step. Thus, any
shipowner "privity or knowledge" of acts or omissions which do not give
rise to liability in the first instance are irrelevant to the analysis of a
shipowner's right to limitation. This distinction is particularly important in
analyzing the effect of vessel unseaworthiness on the owner's right to
limitation. U.S. courts on occasion wrongly apply the privity or knowledge
test to allegations of unseaworthy conditions under circumstances where the
shipowner owed no duty of seaworthiness to the claimants.

44Gilmore & Black, supra note 42, § 10-24, at 886-87.
45
See Federazione Italiana dei Corsorzi Agrari v. Mandansk Compania de Vapores, S.A. (The
Perama), 388 F.2d 434, 1968 AMC 315 (2d Cir.) (recognizing in dictum a non-delegable duty to provide
a seaworthy vessel "in the primitive sense"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968). But see Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Gay Cottons (The Chickasaw), 414 F.2d 724, 729, 1969 AMC 1682 (9th Cir. 1969) (rejecting
the non-delegable duty basis for denying limitation in a case involving liability to cargo after finding that
"[n]otwithstanding the conclusion of Gilmore & Black, we have found no case which has denied
limitation of liability because of the negligence of a non-managerial employee. On the contrary, all cases
denying limitation of liability to a corporate shipowner have emphasized that the negligence or lack of
due diligence to make seaworthy was attributable to managerial personnel.").
46
Gilmore & Black, supra note 42, § 10-24, at 887 n.101.
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A. The Limited Duty of Seaworthiness
In the exoneration step of the court's limitation analysis the court will
recognize that a shipowner may owe a duty of seaworthiness, whether by
express or implied contract or under the general maritime law, but only to
select classes of potential claimants. In some cases, the warranty is said to
be non-delegable; in others it is not. The duty of seaworthiness may be
imposed on the vessel owner, the charterer, or the seaman's employer, each
of whose entitlement to limitation must be separately analyzed. In claims
alleging injury caused by an unseaworthy condition arising after a vessel has
been demise chartered, and without the owner's fault, privity, or knowledge,
the owner may limit liability, even though the demise charterer might not.
Finally, the applicable standard of care and the point in time at which the
vessel's seaworthiness is relevant vary according to the status of the
claimant.
A warranty of seaworthiness extends to the vessel's crew and the
so-called Sieracki seamen, but no such warranty (or duty) extends to
passengers, 47 visitors, 48 or longshore and harbor workers. 49 The duty to
50
crewmembers to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute and non-delegable.
In other contexts, the claimant might have to demonstrate some degree of
culpability on the part of the owner or charterer. Decisions such as that by
the Eleventh Circuit in The Summit Venture5 l that equate negligence and
seaworthiness because both are tested by "reasonableness" lose sight of the
important distinction between the two fault concepts. "Reasonableness" is
the metric by which the shipowner's level of care in taking precautions
against injury in a negligence action is evaluated. A shipowner that fails to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances is liable for an injury
proximately caused by that negligence. By contrast, reasonableness is the
metric by which the condition of the ship is measured in seaworthiness
actions. A vessel that is not reasonably fit for her intended service is
unseaworthy. The level of care the owner must exercise in providing a
seaworthy vessel varies according to the type of claim involved. A COGSA
47

Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1059, 1975 AMC 2071 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a racing

sloop
owner owed his passengers a duty of reasonable care, but not a warranty of seaworthiness).
48
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959) (holding
that a shipowner owes visitors a duty of reasonable care).
49See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
50
Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 1971 AMC 277 (1977) (explaining that
"[u]nseaworthiness is a condition, and how that condition came into being-whether by negligence or
otherwise-is quite irrelevant to the owner's liability for personal injuries resulting from it.").
51
Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Florida, 768 F.2d 1558, 1564 & n.3 (1 Ith Cir. 1985)
("merging" its analysis of negligence and unseaworthiness "because the test of reasonableness is the
primary inquiry under both categories.").
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carrier owes cargo a statutory duty to exercise due diligence to ensure the
vessel is seaworthy at the beginning of her voyage. An owner (or head
charterer) may extend express or implied warranties of seaworthiness to a
charterer. Such warranties may be superseded by including in the charter
party a Clause Paramount, substituting the COGSA "due diligence" standard
for the default warranty under general maritime law.
Turning from the exoneration inquiry regarding fault to the limitation
analysis regarding privity or knowledge, the court will recognize that under
agency principles, "knowledge" of an unsafe condition is generally not
imputed to the owner until there has been a reasonable opportunity to
communicate the information to the owner. 52 Alternatively, the injured party
may seek to prove that the unseaworthy condition was not timely detected
because the owner failed to discharge its duty of inspection. However,
notwithstanding the urgings of Professors Gilmore and Black, automatic
imputation of knowledge of an unseaworthy condition to the owner is
otherwise inconsistent with the privity or knowledge standard.
Any generalized analysis of an owner's privity or knowledge of an
unseaworthy condition in the second step of a limitation of liability analysis
that overlooks the integral limitations on the seaworthiness doctrine is
inconsistent with the terms of the Limitation Act and its relationship with the
underlying bases of liability. The error is apparent in the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson.53 Anderson concerned claims

against the F/V Bora Bora vessel interests arising out of the vessel's allision
with the bridge. Construction workers on the bridge were injured in the
accident. The Fifth Circuit assumed, without discussion, in its limitation
analysis that the vessel owner owed bridge workers and owners a duty to
provide a seaworthy vessel. Had the court properly conducted its limitation
analysis in two steps, it would have first determined whether the bridge
owner and the bridgeworkers injured in the allision established actionable
fault on the part of the vessel and her crew. Because a vessel owner owes no
duty of seaworthiness to a bridge owner or to workers on the bridge, the
"exoneration" analysis would turn on the claimants' proof of causative
negligence by the vessel's crew. The second step "limitation" analysis
would then ask whether the causative negligence occurred with the owner's
privity or knowledge-not whether the owner knew or should have known
of an unseaworthy condition. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
committed a similar error in Hercules Carriers,Inc. v. Claimant State of
52

See Restatement of Agency, supra note 19, § 278.
53398 F.2d 204, 210, 1968 AMC 2664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 983 (1968). The same court,
in Farrell Lines Inc. v. Jones (The African Neptune), 530 F.2d 7, 10-12, 1976 AMC !639 (5th Cir. 1976),
embarked on an analysis of whether the vessel involved was unseaworthy when it allided with a bridge
without first identifying any parties to whom a duty of seaworthiness was owed.
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Florida(The Summit Venture), 54 a limitation action by the vessel owner for
claims arising out of the vessel's tragic allision with the Sunshine Skyway
Bridge in Tampa Bay.
By contrast, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in In re
Kinsman Transit Co., recognized that limitation would be denied for an

alleged breach of a warranty of seaworthiness only as to those claimants to
whom the duty was owed. 55 Building on Judge Friendly's analysis, the
correct rule is that an owner will be denied limitation for damage or injury
caused by an unseaworthy condition of the vessel only: (1) with respect to
those claimants to whom a duty of seaworthiness is owed; (2) upon proof of
an unseaworthy condition; (3) upon proof of breach; and, (4) where the
shipowner cannot prove that the unseaworthy condition occurred without its
privity or knowledge.

B. Unseaworthiness and the Personal Contracts Exception

The duty to provide a seaworthy vessel may be imposed by statute, as in
COGSA, 56 or by the general maritime law. The general maritime law duty
may sound in warranty.5 7 In evaluating the precedential value of decisions
denying limitation in cases alleging unseaworthiness, it is critical to
determine in each case whether the result was dictated by the personal
contracts exception to limitation. 58 Where the duty to provide a seaworthy
vessel derives from a "personal contract" by the petitioning shipowner,
limitation may be denied on that basis alone. 59 Because the warranty is a
54768 F.2d at 1565-66 (holding that because the owner has "a non-delegable duty to provide a
competent master and crew, unseaworthiness can be caused by insufficient manning of the vessel or an
incompetent crew."). The court did not identify to whom such a duty was owed.
55
1n re Kinsman Transit Co. (The MacGilvray Shiras), 338 F.2d 708, 716, 1964 AMC 2503 (2d Cir.
1964) (holding that Continental's claim that Kinsman may not limit liability because of its breach of the
warranty of seaworthiness in the storage contract is defeated both by the lack of proof breach "and by
the fact that the exception would apply only to damage to the stored cargo, which did not occur."), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). The court also distinguished between the scope of the duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel to crewmembers and the distinct duty to cargo. Id. at n.3.
5646 U.S.C. app. § 1304(1).
57
See, e.g., Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 1955 AMC 488 (1955) (holding owner
liable for "breach of the warranty of seaworthiness" to seaman injured by fellow crewmember).
58Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106 (1911) (holding that shipowner may not limit liability for
"his own fault, neglect, and contracts."). But see Earl & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd.
(The Galileo), 287 U.S. 420, 429, 1933 AMC 1 (1932) (bills of lading are "ship's documents," and do
not fall within the personal contracts exception).
59See Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406, 410, 1943 AMC 18 (1943) ("[w]e are not
concerned here, however, with the question of limitation of liability where the loss was occasioned by
the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The limitation acts have long been held not to apply where the liability
of the owner rests on his personal contract.") (citations omitted).
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personal contract, no privity or knowledge inquiry is necessary to defeat
limitation.
IV
LIMITATION AND CHOICE OF LAW
The federal courts' outdated choice of law approach in limitation of
liability has been examined ably elsewhere. 60 Most would agree that Justice
Holmes' lex fori choice of law rule in The Titanic, 61 and the enigmatic
"attaches-to-the-right" gloss added by Justice Frankfurter in The Norwalk
Victory, 6 2

will poorly serve the needs of international maritime litigation in
the 21st century and should be replaced with the modem Lauritzen-Rhoditis
admiralty choice of law approach. 63 In evaluating the need for a modern
choice of law approach, the courts should be mindful of the unique context
of international maritime litigation and the growing importance of its choice
of law methodology. Foreign defendants are generally protected against the
burden of litigating in the U.S., when unreasonable, by principles of personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. Shipowners may find, however, that
neither principle affords them the same level of protection as it does for
non-maritime defendants. Claimants may, for example, avoid personal
jurisdiction limitations by invoking in rem or maritime attachment procedures under the admiralty supplemental rules. And even if a federal court
determines that the claims against the foreign shipowner should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds a state court may be free to permit
those same claims to go forward. 64 Thus, the courts' limitation of liability
choice of law approach may take on added importance.
As the court's choice of law approach in limitation gains sophistication,
the courts may be confronted with the question whether a decision to deny
limitation under U.S. law, after finding that the causative fault occurred with
the owner's knowledge, necessarily precludes the court from granting
limitation under the law of the vessel's flag. The U.S Limitation Act
provides that the qualified owner's liability "shall not exceed" the amount
prescribed by the Act. 65 Nothing in the text of the statute itself precludes
application of foreign law under circumstances where the owner is denied
60

See W. Tetley, International Conflict of Laws: Common, Civil and Maritime 518-31 (1994);
Comment, A New Role for Interest Analysis in Admiralty Limitation of Liability Conflicts, 21 Tex. Int'l
L.J. 495 (1986).
61Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic), 233 U.S. 718, 1998 AMC 2699 (1914).
62
Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, Ltd., 336 U.S. 386, 1949 AMC 393 (1949).
63
See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 1953 AMC 1210 (1953); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis,
398 U.S. 306, 1970 AMC 994 (1970).
64American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 1994 AMC 913 (1994).

6546 U.S.C. app. § 183(a).
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the right to limit under U.S. law, and nothing in the Act dictates the
substance-procedure distinction in the existing choice of law methodology.
Professor Tetley concludes that the right to limit is generally seen as a
question of substantive law, to be governed by the same law that determines
the responsibility for the casualty, while the amount of the limitation fund
66
was characterized as a matter of procedure, to be governed by the lex fori.
The question might well be raised by a party who would not, under U.S. law,
be entitled to limit liability, but obtains such rights from the 1976 LLMC, or
by an owner who is not eligible for limitation under the U.S. privity or
knowledge standard but would be eligible under the more forgiving standard
in the 1976 LLMC Convention. Would such a result do violence to the rule
in The Titanic?67 I think not.
V
LIMITATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY
MANAGEMENT CODE
In 1994, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) 68 was amended to require vessel operators to implement the ISM
Code. 69 SOLAS and the ISM Code require vessel operators to establish a
Safety Management System (SMS) for their business and its vessels. The
Company's SMS must include a safety and environmental protection policy,
instructions, and procedures to ensure vessels are operated in accordance
with relevant flag State and international regulations, defined levels of
authority and lines of communication between and among shore and
shipboard personnel, procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the ISM Code, procedures for preparing and responding to
emergencies, and procedures for internal audits and management reviews.
To ensure the safe operation of its vessels and to provide a link between
the Company and those on board the vessels, each Company must designate
a person ashore who will be responsible for monitoring the safety and
pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each vessel. The Company's
Designated Person Ashore (DPA) must have direct access to the highest
66

Tetley, supra note 60, at 509 -10 & 524-3 1.
Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Mellor (The Titanic), 233 U.S. 718, 732, 1998 AMC 2699 (1914)
(holding that claimants who elect to sue the defendant in the U.S. are limited by the U.S. Limitation Act).
The Court was not required to address situations in which the owner was not eligible for limitation under
the U.S. Limitation Act.
68Done at London, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700, reprinted in 6D Benedict on
Admiralty, Doc. No. 14-1 (7th rev. ed. 1997).
69
1ntemational Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
(International Safety Management Code), Annex to IMO Res. A.741(18), done at London, Nov. 4, 1993,
reprinted in 6D Benedict, supra note 68, Doc. No. 14-2.
67
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level of management. The advent of the ISM Code and its well-informed and
communicative DPA is likely to render limitation in the U.S. even more
elusive if the DPA's actual or constructive knowledge or negligence by the
DPA is imputed to shipowners.
A. Limitation Analysis for ISM Code Vessels
Limitation in the ISM Code era will present two issues. First, whether the
DPA will be deemed "sufficiently high" in the ship-owning corporation such
that the DPA's acts, omissions, and knowledge are considered those of the
corporation. The answer to this question will require a particularized
analysis of the DPA's position in the Company seeking limitation and the
extent of his or her authority over the vessel and her operations. The privity
or knowledge of shoreside managers70 or managing agents71 may be imputed
to the owning corporation. However, nothing in the ISM Code requires the
DPA to have actual management authority. Indeed, the ISM Code speaks
only of the DPA having "direct access" to the Company's management.
Thus, unless the owner confers management authority on the DPA beyond
that which the ISM Code requires, the DPA will not likely be "sufficiently
high" in the corporation to automatically attribute the DPA's actions or
knowledge to the owner.
If the DPA is not sufficiently high in the corporation for direct attribution
of privity or knowledge, the second question that arises, under circumstances
where causative fault by the shipowner has been established, is what kind of
knowledge by the DPA will be imputed to the corporation and when? If the
Restatement of Agency approach is adopted for guidance, the DPA's actual
knowledge will be imputed to the owner,72 but only after a reasonable time
for communication has passed.7 3 The Restatement would not, however,
74
impute the DPA's constructive knowledge to the shipowner.
B. An Opportunityfor GreaterInternationalHarmony?
It would be extravagant to suggest that it is within the discretion of the
federal courts to completely harmonize the U.S. Limitation Act with the
70

Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Prudential Lines, Inc. (The Hellenic), 813 F.2d 634, 1987 AMC 2470 (4th
Cir. 1987).
71In re New England Fish. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1003, 1979 AMC 1910 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
72
Cf. Restatement of Agency, supra note 19, § 275 (where an agent has a duty to disclose knowledge
to the principal, knowledge by the agent is imputed to the principal).
73
1d. § 278. Illustration 2 to comment a describes an example in which an insured has not yet learned
of a vessel's sinking at the time he insures it, even though his agent has learned of it.
74
1d. § 275, comment b. See also id. § 277 (information which an agent "should" know is not imputed
to the owner unless the principal has a duty to exercise care in obtaining the information).
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widely accepted 1976 LLMC. The LLMC Convention extends to a far
broader class of actors and prescribes very different limits of liability. Under
U.S. law, limitation is denied if any causative fault occurred with the
owner's privity or knowledge, while the 1976 LLMC Convention denies
limitation only if the loss resulted from a personal act or omission by the
party seeking limitation, committed with the intent to cause such loss, or
75
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.

Despite these important differences between the regimes, it is within the
courts' province to construe the U.S. privity or knowledge standard in a
manner that promotes international harmony while remaining consistent
with the language and purpose of the statute.
In the final analysis, limitation decisions turn on the construction and
application of a statute. Accordingly, the text and structure of the statute
control the courts' decision. In deciding how to evaluate the role of the DPA
and the effect of the DPA's knowledge on shipowner limitation, the courts
have considerable latitude under the very general language of both the
Limitation Act and the statutes implementing the ISM Code to adopt
constructions that best serve the legislative purposes of each. Congress did
not define privity or knowledge in the Limitation Act. It will be recalled that
early decisions limited the fatal "knowledge" element to actual knowledge,
expressly rejecting the constructive knowledge standard.7 6 It might therefore
be asked whether it would be consistent with the language and intent of the
Limitation Act and the ISM Code to adopt a construction that penalizes the
shipowner who is most aggressive in implementing the ISM Code regime by
denying that shipowner the benefits of the Limitation Act through an
expansive interpretation of privity and knowledge.
VI
CONCLUSION
In one version or another, shipowner limitation of liability regimes are
likely to be with us for the foreseeable future. Though the present U.S.
regime is badly in need of congressional attention, it remains within the
federal courts' power to improve its utility by modernizing the choice of law
approach and by closely scrutinizing the relevance of vessel seaworthiness
in their limitation analyses. With the implementation of the new ISM Code,
the privity or knowledge analysis will also take on added importance. Those
who seek to promote international harmony and reduce the incentives for
75
76

LLMC Convention, supra note 8, art. 4.

The 84-H, 296 F. 427, 1924 AMC 774 (2d Cir.) (holding that "[t]he privity or knowledge must be
actual and not merely constructive"), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 596 (1924).
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forum shopping in the era of the ISM Code will seek to avoid an expansive
construction of the privity or knowledge standard under the U.S. Limitation
Act that will only widen the gap between the U.S. and the parties to 1976
LLMC Convention.

